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 D. G. McVitie and L. B. Wilson, Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets, BIT Numerical Mathematics, 10 no. 3 (1970) 295–309.
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 L. E. Dubins and D. A. Freedman, Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm, Amer. Math. Monthly, 88 no. 7 (1981) 485–494.
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 A. E. Roth and E. Peranson, The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design, American Economic Review, 89 no. 4 (1999) 748–780.
 B. Aldershof and O. M. Carducci, Stable matchings with couples, Discrete Appl. Math., 68 no. 1-2 (1996) 203–207.
 A. E. Roth and J. H. V. Vate, Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching, Econometrica, 58 no. 6 (1990) 1475–1480.
 F. Kojima, P. A. Pathak and A. E. Roth, Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 16028, 2010.
 A. E. Roth, A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom, The American Economic Review, 81 no. 3 (1991) 415–440.
 J. Ma, T. Sjöstróm, Matching in Marriage and Markets, Eur. Math. Soc. Newsl., no. 89 (2013) 31–35.